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The establishment of a wave of new regulatory measures against credit rating agencies 
operating in Russia, in conjunction with pressures emanating from International sanctions, 
has resulted in an exodus of the established rating agencies, like Moody’s and Fitch. In their 
place, the recently established ‘Analytical Credit Rating Agency’ is attempting to provide a 
different approach to the rating of Russian debt. However, the agency has been dogged by its 
apparent connection to the Kremlin, and in this article the focus will be upon the importance 
of perception in the rating arena and why, ultimately, The ACRA will be dismissed on the 
global stage as a mere instrument of the Russian Government. 
 
In 2015, the Russian Federation issued new regulations aimed at regulating the rating 
agencies that operate in Russia much more closely than ever before. The regulations, which 
in essence are based upon the European regulatory framework that governs the agencies in 
the E.U., are however much more restrictive than their European or American counterparts. 
For example, there is an increased supervisory system, whereby the Russian Central Bank 
keeps a daily account of the agencies’ compliance. Furthermore, the new regulations allow 
for the Central Bank to actively interfere with the composition of the agency, particularly in 
terms of board members who ‘no longer [meet] the minimum requirements for eligibility’1. 
This is rather different than the approach taken in Europe and America and, as such, the 
rating agencies, notably Moody’s and Fitch, have already withdrawn from Russia. There are, 
however, a number of reasons for this rather than just being uncomfortable with the new 
regime, and this short article will discuss those reasons. Yet, for this article, the focus will be 
on something else; the aims of the Russian Government in facilitating the development of a 
Russian alternative to the dominance of the Big Three are too transparent and, as such, the 
likelihood of obtaining any sort of success of minimal at best. This is for one reason alone – 
the perceived independence of a new entry is all important, and the Analytical Credit Rating 
Agency (ACRA) unfortunately is, to all intents and purposes, a vehicle for President Putin’s 
politics, rightly or wrongly. 
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 The ACRA was set up in 2015 and its shareholders consist of 27 major Russian companies 
and financial institutions2. It claims to provide all of the aspects that other rating agencies 
claim to provide, i.e. independence, timeliness, prevention of conflicts of interests, and 
transparency, but the most crucial element, perhaps, is that it is the first and only agency to 
have been granted the licence to operate under the new regulations3. With a comparatively 
small working capital of $44 million, the agency clearly is not going to threaten the 
dominance of the Big Three on the global stage, but the Russian government does aim to use 
the ratings of ACRA as a yardstick for its investments and, hopefully, as a potential 
demonstration of the creditworthiness of Russian debt to outsiders. However, whilst some 
have been quick to praise the artificial facilitation of the growth of an alternative4, based upon 
the Russian Central Banks plans to create a company that would be immune to ‘geopolitical 
risks’5, the obvious question to ask is why an investor would pay attention to the ratings of 
ACRA instead of the Big Three’s ratings? 
 
Even though the Russian Central Bank stopped using the Big Three’s ratings in its decision-
making process after the international backlash of Russia’s annexation of Crimea6, this can 
only have one of two consequences; either, Russian investors follow suit and the country 
becomes even more isolated, or foreign investors refuse to take ACRA’s ratings into account 
and, essentially, Russian debt becomes extraordinarily risky and, even though credit ratings 
are not the sole measure of creditworthiness, the country is taken off the table when it comes 
to being ‘investable’. Both outcomes allude to the same issue – what do investors think? It is 
this question that defines the ability to provide alternatives to the established order, as other 
rating endeavours have found out7. 
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What investors think about the credibility of rating agencies is an issue which needs to be 
contextualised appropriately. The Big Three are not dominant in the marketplace because of 
the common acceptance that their performance merits it – far from it – but rather that their 
ratings are used in a particular way by investors; either in terms of providing easy-to-
understand measures for retail investors8, or by reducing the ‘agency’ issue within large 
‘sophisticated’ investors9. Either way, the aspect that keeps the Big Three in the position that 
they are is that they are a known entity in an arena that seldom appreciates revolution – the 
fact that the Big Three’s position was enhanced and further entrenched after the Financial 
Crisis, an era which they purposely acted against investors10, is proof of this sentiment. So, in 
light of this, what chance does ACRA have of providing any sort of meaningful alternative to 
the Big Three? The answer lies in the understanding of the importance of perception in this 
arena, which has been understood by legislators in America11 and Europe12. The Big Three, 
even though they are often perceived as being part of a US-Centric structure13, have 
familiarity on their side, and it is clear to see why ACRA would not be afforded such leeway, 
in terms of any potential issues. Also, the battle between the Big Two and the U.S. 
Department of Justice14 indicates that whilst it is true that the largest agencies were founded 
and reside in the U.S., and that knowledge emanating from the West has a special salience to 
it15, the agencies are in fact independent, because their venality means they only serve to 
function in their own interests, arguably. Therefore, whilst the Big Three have many issues, 
their perceived lack of independence can be traced to the issuer-pays remuneration model, 
rather than a lack of independence based upon political influences. This issue of political 
influence is consistently affecting the endeavours of the ‘BRICS’ nations16. 
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 Ultimately, the latest endeavour by an ‘outsider’ to influence the credit rating industry will, 
arguably, result in failure. In the non-profit sector the issue is funding, and now in the for-
profit sector the issue is rapidly becoming about perceived independence from political 
pressure. It seems as if investors are comfortable with what they know, rather than being 
willing to allow an unknown entity into the equation. Although ACRA is adamant that it is 
independent, the political landscape in Russia, in conjunction with the timing and legal 
framework that has been set up alludes to the understanding that ACRA is, essentially, 
Putin’s rating agency. Although it is understandable that a country will want to free itself 
from the constraining shackles of having to bow to the economic pressure a credit rating 
agency can bring to a country, it is likely that the new Russian laws will make Russian debt 
particularly unattractive to foreign investors – even though there has been an upsurge in 
isolationist and anti-globalisation rhetoric in the past year with political events in the U.S. and 
E.U., the fact still remains that accessing the global capital markets is vital to the health of an 
economy, and in this light Russia’s response to what it sees as mistreatment by the Big Three 
could make its situation much worse.  
 
